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and to the challenges they pose to the left liberalism she
espouses. So, for instance, although she is well aware of
many of the problems with the idea of “needs,” she rather
gives the impression of resolving them without actually
doing so. The claim that “the identification and interpretation of needs have a socially constructed aspect
and also involve a personal ascription of these needs to
oneself ” (p. 98) is immediately followed by the assertion that we have a need for, among other things,
art. But many people can and do live worthwhile lives
without art. Why not, say, a need for religion, or the
“spiritual,” which is lacking from her list? Or, to
give another example: When she claims that a linguistically differentiated cultural minority has a “group right
to provide the means for the perpetuation of that linguistic community” but not the right to “insist that all
of its members [be] required to be educated only in
that language” (p. 124), she simply passes over the
hard question of whether the minority culture has a
right to insist that all its members be educated in its
language as a first language. Or, again, there is little
real effort to address the problems posed for her conception of democracy by environmental problems that may
have catastrophic consequences for future generations.
Surprisingly, her response to the objection that future
persons cannot participate in democratic decision making appears to be that we must “narrow the participation
requirement to make it more manageable” (p. 226), not
to find a better way of including the interests of future
generations. Unfortunately, this tendency is at its most
marked in the final chapter on terrorism in which some
optimistic sentiments about human solidarity are combined with the largely uncomprehending parochialism
with which so many Americans seem to view terrorism
post 9/11.
Ultimately, although she is not unique in this, I worry
that Gould’s political prescriptions float free of any viable
conception of political agency. Some might say that this
is merely an empirical matter, and not the province of
political philosophy. But I am not complaining that she
does not offer practical mechanisms for effecting change,
only that we need to have some conception of how her
theoretical prescriptions could be brought about in a way
that both is consistent with her theory and has at least a
modicum of empirical plausibility. For instance, given
the way a globalized economy works, many of Gould’s
proposals for economic democratization require nearuniversal simultaneous changes in the global market. But
we have very little idea of what political agency could
bring these about, and probably none at all of how they
could be brought about democratically. In fairness, many
readers will not be exercised by these concerns to the
extent I am. And, as I said earlier, there is indeed much
that is worthwhile in the detailed discussion and
argumentation.

Indeterminacy and Society. By Russell Hardin. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2003. 192p. $39.95 cloth, $14.95 paper.
— Dan Sabia, University of South Carolina

Russell Hardin aims in this wide-ranging text to explain
the sources of indeterminacy in social life, its implications
for theory, and its consequences for practice. Indeterminacy marks circumstances in which individual and collective actors cannot determine the results or outcomes of
their choices, not so much because of lack of power or
causal ignorance (which might be remedied) but because
the social world characteristically presents them with stochastic and strategic problems, and therefore forces on
them stochastic and strategic choices. The two problems
are distinct but often related. Stochastic problems arise
whenever choice carries with it the possibility of harm; in
many social and political contexts, the possibilities and
the identities of those harmed may or may not be known,
and these factors matter in ways Hardin discusses.
The author emphasizes strategic problems, however,
in part because stochastic problems in contexts of collective choice often arise due to possible outcomes that are
produced by strategic interactions. Here, individual choosers select strategies to advance their interests, and outcomes depend on what all involved in the interaction
choose to do; but what all will choose to do is contingent and cannot usually be known, and so outcomes are
unpredictable and strategies indeterminate. Supposing that
iterated prisoner’s dilemma “is a good model of much of
the life of exchange and cooperation” (p. 6), Hardin argues
in Chapter 2 that in fixed number iterated play, rational
strategies cannot be theoretically specified. Demanding,
as some rational choice theorists do, that there be some
determinate rational strategy (such as always-defect on
the basis of the well-known backward-induction argument) “is not sensible, which means that there is no best
strategy” (p. 21).
Hardin’s central thesis, that indeterminacy is unavoidable and pervasive for these reasons, is correct, and he
contends that this is a truth too often ignored or denied.
Although the contention is exaggerated, it is not without
merit. Since indeterminacy is extensive, our desire for
determinate social theories and for social and political
mastery should be restrained, but this is a prescription
often resisted. Hence, part of Hardin’s effort is spent
criticizing those thinkers and schools of thought, in economics, law, and political, social, and moral theory, who
have mistakenly developed or defended determinate
responses to problems of indeterminacy. Included are game
theorists and economists who suppose that choice theory
is determinate (e.g., Harsanyi in game theory), theorists
who assume that welfare can be cardinalized (e.g.,
Bentham’s utilitarianism), and theorists who assume that
unconditional rules of conduct can be justified (e.g., Kant’s
deontological ethics).
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The author also discusses thinkers who have dealt with
indeterminacy more or less successfully, either by adopting what he terms “pragmatic responses” and “tricks,” or
“by making indeterminacy an assumption or conclusion
of the analysis, as in Arrow’s theorem” (p. 6). Pragmatic
responses are helpful, though limited and possibly misleading; making indeterminacy a fundamental assumption is not misleading but it is often limited. Hobbes’s
solution to the problem of social order is exemplary. He
justified the necessity of government, primarily, by adopting the principle of mutual advantage ex ante, a normative principle championed by Hardin throughout the text.
The principle asserts that we should adopt a collective
choice or policy when, ex ante, it serves the interests of
each and all. Hobbes contended that social order, and
therefore government, does precisely this. But while this is
motivating insofar as we all do share an interest in order,
we also have other divergent and conflicting interests, and
these may well lead us to disagree about the sort of government we think best. This indeterminacy Hobbes avoids
by adopting the “trick” of contending that “we know too
little about the effectiveness of various forms of government to be very confident of the superiority (for our own
interest) of any one form over any other” (p. 43). He
invokes, in other words, the principle of insufficient reason in order to secure the conclusion that, given our indeterminate circumstances, we should accept government—
any government.
The principles of mutual advantage and insufficient reason are often employed by Hardin to describe ways of
dealing with problems of indeterminacy. Stochastic policy
and institutional choices, for example, may serve shared
interests, and sometimes, the risks they carry are known in
the aggregate but are unknown at the individual level (e.g.,
vaccination policies, creating a criminal justice system).
Then mutual advantage ex ante can be motivational and
ignorance functional; when individuals know or suspect
they will be harmed, institutional and policy proposals are
likely to be opposed and may be stymied. On the other
hand, many concrete policies are not obviously advantageous to all, and that knowledge may justify pragmatic
responses, such as sanctioning the theoretically suspect
move of making interpersonal comparisons of utility at
the policy level, when doing so secures broad, mutually
advantageous, institutional goals.
In the last of the eight chapters in his text, Hardin
again observes that institutions, such as a criminal justice
system, can often be justified ex ante “as mutually advantageous in our expectations (although the choice between
alternative institutions [e.g., what kind of criminal justice
system] may not be),” and that specific policies often cannot be justified in this manner (p. 125). This leads him to
argue for a “two-stage theory” of government, in which
institutions and broad policy goals come first, implementation and more concrete decisions second. He thinks this

means that those who administer institutions and implement policies that serve mutual advantage should be compelled to perform their roles and tasks, rather than be
granted discretion to serve the larger purposes of the institution (pp. 126–27). More plausibly, it leads him to the
related conclusion that if we accept what are always imperfect institutions on the grounds of mutual advantage, we
must “to some extent” permit mutual advantage considerations to trump specific considerations of justice (e.g.,
as accepting a criminal justice system means knowingly
allowing some miscarriages of justice) (p. 129). It also
leads Hardin to again defend pragmatically accepting the
making of interpersonal comparisons of welfare in some
policy contexts.
Indeterminacy thus makes of Hardin a consequentialist
in moral and social theory, where consequences are, in
general, judged in terms of welfare construed ordinally,
rather than cardinally. And it makes him a political
institutionalist who believes that indeterminacy is often
resolved “mechanically” or pragmatically, as opposed to
theoretically. Institutions resolve our collective problems
“mechanically” when the principle of mutual advantage
leads us to select this or that specific institution, even
though that principle is not likely to entail the specific
choice made. And institutions may “even impose [determinate] theory on us,” as they do when they force us to
accept injustice in a mutually advantageous institution
like a criminal justice system, and when they force us to
accept interpersonal comparisons of cardinal utility to
implement institutional goals (p. 121).
Space considerations require ignoring in this review other
arguments and themes canvassed in Hardin’s text, including his mostly appreciative discussion of Coase’s theorem in Chapter 5 and mostly critical assessment of John
Rawls in Chapter 7. Overall, I found some of the arguments repetitive and not always well organized, and should
note that much of what is on offer here has been presented
by Hardin elsewhere, not just in various articles but in his
earlier books, particularly Collective Action (1982) and
Morality Within the Limits of Reason (1988). But like those
earlier efforts, this text makes worthwhile and provocative
contributions to rational choice theory in particular, and
to social and political theory more generally.
The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global.
By Virginia Held. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 220p. $45.
— Joan Cocks, Mount Holyoke College

In her latest book, Virginia Held elaborates on themes
from previously published articles to explicate and defend
the ethics of care. For those unfamiliar with this welldeveloped tendency of feminist thought, she reviews its
evolution from the 1980s writings of Sara Ruddick, Carol
Gilligan, and Nel Noddings to the more recent work of
theorists including, among many others, Eva Kittay,
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